Abstract. In 1996, Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman introduced an efficient lattice based encryption scheme dubbed NTRUEncrypt. Unfortunately, this scheme lacks a proof of security. However, in 2011, Stehlé and Steinfeld showed how to modify NTRUEncrypt to reduce security to standard problems in ideal lattices. In 2012, López-Alt, Tromer and Vaikuntanathan proposed a fully homomorphic scheme based on this modified system. However, to allow homomorphic operations and prove security, a non-standard assumption is required. In this paper, we show how to remove this non-standard assumption via techniques introduced by Brakerski and construct a new fully homomorphic encryption scheme from the Stehlé and Steinfeld version based on standard lattice assumptions and a circular security assumption. The scheme is scale-invariant and therefore avoids modulus switching and the size of ciphertexts is one ring element. Moreover, we present a practical variant of our scheme, which is secure under stronger assumptions, along with parameter recommendations and promising implementation results. Finally, we present an approach for encrypting larger input sizes by extending ciphertexts to several ring elements via the CRT on the message space.
Introduction
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is a powerful form of encryption which allows an untrusted server to carry out arbitrary computation on encrypted data on behalf of a client. Introduced in [20] by Adleman, Dertouzos and Rivest, the problem of constructing a scheme which can evaluate any function on encrypted data remained open until 2009, when Gentry constructed an FHE scheme based on ideal lattices [9] . Gentry's scheme effectively laid down a blueprint for constructing FHE schemes and paved the way for many further constructions [26, 2, 3, 5, 4, 23, 19, 10, 8] . The main focus of the cryptologic research community has been on improving the efficiency of FHE and basing its security on standard assumptions.
Recently, López-Alt et al. [15] proposed a (multi-key) FHE scheme based on the work by Stehlé and Steinfeld [24] in which a provably secure version of NTRUEncrypt [12] is presented with security based on standard problems in ideal lattices. Unfortunately, the FHE scheme from [15] needs to make an additional assumption relating to the uniformity of the public key, the so-called decisional small polynomial ratio (DSPR) assumption, to allow homomorphic operations and remain semantically secure. We show how to avoid this additional assumption and transform the results from [24] into a fully homomorphic encryption scheme based on standard lattice assumptions only. This is achieved by limiting noise growth during homomorphic operations via a tensoring technique recently introduced by Brakerski [2] . Besides this theoretical advantage, our scheme has other attractive properties. Firstly, this new scheme is scale-invariant in the sense of [2] , i.e. it avoids the modulus-switching technique of Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan [3] . Secondly, we keep the property of the scheme in [15] that a ciphertext consists of only a single ring element as opposed to the two or more ring elements for schemes based purely on the (ring) learning with errors (RLWE) assumption [16] . This decreases the ciphertext size since parameters are comparable in both settings. Finally, we present a technique to increase the size of the input space by working with separate, small plaintext moduli in ciphertexts of multiple ring elements, which are later combined via the Chinese remainder theorem into a larger plaintext modulus. For some applications, this additional flexibility to increase the message space without changing parameters at the cost of increasing ciphertext size can prove especially useful.
Our main contribution is an FHE scheme based on the schemes by Stehlé and Steinfeld [24] and López-Alt et al. [15] that does not need the DSPR assumption and thus is secure under the RLWE and circular security assumptions only. The public key in both schemes is the fraction h = gf −1 mod q of two polynomials f and g in a cyclotomic polynomial ring modulo an integer modulus q that are sampled from a discrete Gaussian distribution. The DSPR assumption is the assumption that such a fraction is indistinguishable from uniform random in the ring modulo q. Stehlé and Steinfeld show that this assumption holds if the Gaussian is wide enough. Unfortunately, the scheme by López-Alt et al. cannot use such a wide Gaussian for key generation. Since the norms of f and g contribute to the noise growth during homomorphic multiplication, using a wide enough Gaussian means that the scheme is not guaranteed to be capable of doing even a single multiplication. We solve this problem by using decompositions and Brakerski's [2] tensoring technique. During the homomorphic multiplication procedure which includes a key switching step, we decompose the polynomial f into its bit decomposition, i.e. into a vector of polynomials with binary coefficients. This technique replaces the ring product of polynomials by a scalar product of binary decomposition vectors with vectors of polynomials multiplied by powers of 2 modulo q. The noise growth introduced in such a scalar product is bounded by a polynomial in log(q) and the degree of f , replacing the square of the norm of f in the bounds of the original scheme. Noise growth is much smaller now and it is possible to sample from a wide Gaussian to ensure the Stehlé-Steinfeld conditions. is Euler's totient function. The elements of R can be uniquely represented by all polynomials in Z[X] of degree less than n. Arithmetic in R is arithmetic modulo Φ d (X), which is implicit whenever we write down terms or equalities involving elements in R. An arbitrary element a ∈ R can be written as a = n−1 i=0 a i X i with a i ∈ Z and we identify a with its vector of coefficients (a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n−1 ). In particular, a can be viewed as an element of the R-vector space R n . We choose the maximum norm on R n to measure the size of elements in R. The maximum norm of a is defined as a ∞ = max i {|a i |}.
When multiplying two elements g, h ∈ R, the norm of their product gh expands with respect to the individual norms of g and h. The maximal norm expansion that can occur is δ = sup { g · h ∞ /( g ∞ h ∞ ) : g, h ∈ R}, which is a ring constant. When d is a power of 2 and thus Φ d (X) = X n + 1, we have δ = n [9, Section 3.4]. To keep the exposition more general, we do not restrict to this special case and work with general δ in most of what follows.
Let χ be a probability distribution on R. We assume that we can efficiently sample elements from R according to χ, and we use the standard notation a ← χ to denote that a ∈ R is sampled from χ. The distribution χ on R is called Bbounded for some B > 0 if for all a ← χ we have a ∞ < B, i.e. a is B-bounded (see [3, Def. 3] and [15, Def. 3.1 and 3.2]). Let us introduce a specific example of a distribution on R. First, define the discrete Gaussian distribution D Z,σ with mean 0 and standard deviation σ over the integers, which assigns a probability proportional to exp(−π|x| 2 /σ 2 ) to each x ∈ Z. When d is a power of 2 and Φ d (X) = X n + 1, we can take χ to be the spherical discrete Gaussian χ = D Z n ,σ , where each coefficient of the polynomial is sampled according to the one-dimensional distribution D Z,σ (see [16] for more details and why χ = D Z n ,σ is the right choice in that case). The distribution χ is used in many fully homomorphic encryption schemes based on RLWE to sample random error polynomials that have small coefficients with high probability. Such polynomials are a significant part of the noise terms used in the encryption process. To deduce meaningful bounds on noise size and noise growth during homomorphic operations, we assume that the distribution we are working with is B-bounded for some B. For the discrete Gaussian, this is a reasonable assumption since sampled elements tend to be small with high probability. By rejecting samples with norm larger than B, we can sample from a truncated Gaussian distribution that is statistically close to the true discrete Gaussian if B is chosen large enough. For example, if we take B = 6σ, all samples are B-bounded with very high probability [17, Lemma 4.4] .
Although the principal object of interest for our scheme is the ring R, and all polynomials that we deal with are considered to be elements of R, we often reduce polynomial coefficients modulo an integer modulus q. We denote the map that reduces an integer x modulo q and uniquely represents the result by an element in the interval (−q/2, q/2] by [·] q . We extend this map to polynomials in Z[X] and thus also to elements of R by applying it to their coefficients separately, i.e. [·] 
Furthermore, we extend this notation to vectors of polynomials by applying it to the entries of the vectors separately. Sometimes we reduce an integer modulo q and uniquely represent the result by an element in [0, q). In this case, we write r q (x) to mean the reduction of x into [0, q). A polynomial f ∈ R is invertible modulo q if there exists a polynomial f −1 ∈ R such that f f −1 =f , wheref (X) = i a i X i with a 0 = 1 mod q and a j = 0 mod q for all j = 0. Our homomorphic encryption scheme uses two different moduli. In addition to a modulus q that is used to reduce the coefficients of the elements that represent ciphertexts, there is a second modulus t < q that determines the message space R/tR, i.e. messages are polynomials in R modulo t. We make frequent use of the quantity ∆ = q/t and it is readily verified that q − r t (q) = ∆ · t.
In [2] , functions called BitDecomp and PowersOfTwo are used. We slightly generalize these to an arbitrary base and describe our notation next. Fix a positive integer w > 1 that is used to represent integers in a radix-w system. Let w,q = log w (q) + 2, then a non-negative integer z < q can be written as
z i w i where the z i are integers such that 0 ≤ z i < w. If z is an integer in the interval (−q/2, q/2], it can be written uniquely as
z i w i with z i ∈ (−w/2, w/2]. With this, an element x ∈ R with coefficients in (−q/2, q/2] can be written as
x i w i , where x i ∈ R with coefficients in (−w/2, w/2].
Since then
[x i ] w w i to make clear that the norm of the coefficient polynomials x i is at most w/2. With this notation, define
, this function for w = 2 is called BitDecomp in [2] . We define a second function
, which is called PowersOfTwo in [2] for w = 2. For any two x, y ∈ R, we see that the scalar product of the vectors D w,q (x) and P w,q (y) is the same as the product xy modulo q, because
Note that when f ∞ < B for some B < q, then only the w,B := log w (B) + 2 least significant polynomials in D w,q (f ) can be non-zero. We use the tensor product of two vectors in the usual way, i.e. for a positive integer and two vectors a, b ∈ R , the tensor a ⊗ b ∈ R 2 is the concatenation of the a i b for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , }. We extend the functions D w,q and P w,q to vectors.
Several operations in the scheme require scaling by rational numbers such that the resulting polynomials do not necessarily belong to R but instead have rational coefficients. In that case, a rounding procedure is applied to get back to integer coefficients. The usual rounding of a rational number a to the nearest integer is denoted by a .
The Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) Problem. Our scheme relies on the hardness of the (decisional) ring learning with errors problem, which was first introduced by Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev [16] .
Definition 1 (Decision-RLWE). Given a security parameter λ, let d and q be integers depending on λ, let R = Z[X]/(Φ d (X)) and let R q = R/qR. Given a distribution χ over R q that depends on λ, the Decision-RLWE d,q,χ problem is to distinguish the following two distributions. The first distribution consists of pairs (a, u), where a, u ← R q are drawn uniformly at random from R q . The second distribution consists of pairs of the form (a, a · s + e). The element s ← R q is drawn uniformly at random and is fixed for all samples. For each sample, a ← R q is drawn uniformly at random, and e ← χ. The Decision-RLWE d,q,χ assumption is that the Decision-RLWE d,q,χ problem is hard.
In [16] , it was shown that the hardness of RLWE can be established by a quantum reduction to worst-case shortest vector problems in ideal lattices over the ring R, see also [3, Thm. 2] . It is known that the search variant of RLWE d,q,χ , in which we are required to explicitly find the secret s given an RLWE d,q,χ instance, is equivalent to the decision problem [16] . There are a number of variants of RLWE which are as hard as RLWE, for example we can restrict the sampling of a and e to invertible elements only [24] . And we can also choose s from χ without incurring any loss of security [1] .
The Decisional Small Polynomial Ratio (DSPR) Problem. In [15] , López-Alt, Tromer and Vaikuntanathan introduced the decisional small polynomial ratio problem. They describe a multi-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme with security based on the assumption that the DSPR problem is hard in the ring R q where R = Z[x]/(x n + 1) for n a power of 2 and t = 2. We state a more general form of the problem for any cyclotomic ring R = Z[x]/(Φ d (x)) and general 1 < t < q. Let h = tg/f (mod q) where f = 1 + tf and f , g ← χ where χ is a truncated Gaussian distribution. In [15] , the problem of distinguishing such an element h from a uniformly random element of R q = R/qR was formalized as the DSPR problem. Assuming the hardness of DSPR and RLWE, the scheme in [15] is secure. To state the problem, define the following: for a distribution χ on R q and z ∈ R q we define χ z = χ + z to be the distribution shifted by z. Also, let R × q be the set of all invertible elements in R q . Definition 2 (DSPR). For security parameter λ, let d and q be integers, let
) and R q = R/qR and let χ be a distribution over R q , all depending on λ. Let t ∈ R × q be invertible in R q , y i ∈ R q and z i = −y i t −1 (mod q) for i ∈ {1, 2}. The DSPR d,q,χ problem is to distinguish elements of the form h = a/b where a ← y 1 + t · χ z1 , b ← y 2 + t · χ z2 from uniformly random elements of R q . The DSPR d,q,χ assumption is that the DSPR d,q,χ problem is hard.
Theorem 4.1 in the full version of [24] shows that DSPR d,q,χ is hard when the χ zi are shifted versions of a discrete Gaussian distributions χ which is D Z n ,σ restricted to R × q for a large enough deviation σ. For convenience, we state the theorem in Appendix A. A discrete Gaussian on R × q can be obtained from a discrete Gaussian on R q by rejecting non-invertible elements.
In this section, we describe the basic public key encryption scheme that is the foundation for the leveled schemes of the next sections. The scheme is parameterized by a modulus q and a plaintext modulus 1 < t < q. Ciphertexts are elements of R = Z[X]/(Φ d (X)) and plaintexts are elements of R/tR (see Section 2). Secret keys and errors are generated from different distributions, for example Gaussian distributions of different width. The secret key is derived from the distribution χ key , and errors are sampled from the distribution χ err . We use "Regev-style" encryption as in [2] and [8] . The scheme consists of the following algorithms.
• Basic.ParamsGen(λ): Given the security parameter λ, fix a positive integer d that determines R, moduli q and t with 1 < t < q, and distributions χ key , χ err on R. • Basic.Decrypt(f, c): To decrypt a ciphertext c, compute
In the following, we often refer to a message as an element m in the ring R although the message space is R/tR, keeping in mind that encryption always takes place on the representative [m] t and that by decrypting, all that can be recovered is m modulo t.
Correctness. The following lemma states conditions for a ciphertext c such that the decryption algorithm outputs the message m that was originally encrypted.
Lemma 1. Let q, t, and ∆ = q/t be as above and let c, f, m ∈ R. If there exists v ∈ R such that
e. c decrypts correctly under the secret key f .
Of course, for any given c, f and m, there always exists a v ∈ R such that
But only a v of small norm allows one to recover [m] t from c. Since we are always free to vary v modulo q, i.e. to add any multiple of q to it, we choose v to be the canonical element [v] q . This means that we choose v with the smallest possible norm among all polynomials that satisfy the equation. We call this specific v the inherent noise in c with respect to m and f . The previous lemma says that if the inherent noise in a ciphertext is small enough, then decryption works correctly.
Inherent noise in initial ciphertexts. The following lemma derives a bound on the inherent noise in a freshly encrypted ciphertext output by Basic.Encrypt, assuming bounds B key on the key and B err on the error distributions. Note that since f , g ← χ key we have f ∞ , g ∞ < B key and it follows that tg ∞ < tB key and f ∞ = 1 + tf ∞ < tB key since t ≥ 2.
Lemma 2. Let the key and error distributions be B key -bounded and B err -bounded, respectively. Given m ∈ R, a public key h = [tgf
In particular, by Lemma 1, decryption works correctly if 2δtB key (2B err + 1 2 r t (q))+ r t (q) < ∆.
Leveled Homomorphic Scheme
In this section, we state our leveled homomorphic encryption scheme YASHE 3 based on the Basic scheme from the previous section. We then analyze the homomorphic operations and deduce bounds on the noise growth that occurs during these operations.
• YASHE.ParamsGen(λ): Given the security parameter λ, output the parameters (d, q, t, χ key , χ err , w), where (d, q, t, χ key , χ err ) ← BasicParamsGen(λ) and w > 1 is an integer.
and output (pk, sk, evk) = (h, f, γ).
• YASHE.Decrypt(sk, c): Output the message m ← Basic.Decrypt(sk, c) ∈ R.
• YASHE.KeySwitch(c mult , evk):
• YASHE.Add(c 1 , c 2 ): Compute the addition of c 1 and c 2 as
and output c mult = YASHE.KeySwitch(c mult , evk).
Since encryption and decryption are the same as in the Basic scheme from Section 3, the correctness bound does not change and 
. This means that the size of the inherent noise v add of c add is bounded by
Up to the term r t (q) < t, the inherent noise terms are added during homomorphic addition.
Homomorphic Multiplication. The homomorphic multiplication operation is divided into two parts. The first part describes a basic procedure to obtain an intermediate ciphertext that encrypts the product [m 1 m 2 ] t modulo t of two messages m 1 and m 2 . However, the intermediate ciphertext can not be decrypted with Basic.Decrypt using the secret key f . The second part performs a procedure which allows a public transformation of this intermediate ciphertext to a ciphertext that can be decrypted with f . This latter procedure was introduced in [5] in the form of relinearization and was later expanded in [3] into a method called key switching, which transforms a ciphertext decryptable under one secret key to one decryptable under any other secret key. For our analysis, we assume that χ key and χ err are B key -and B err -bounded, respectively. Even if we work with unbounded Gaussian distributions, this is a valid assumption since elements drawn from either distribution have bounded norm for suitable bounds with high probability. The deduction of noise bounds mostly follows the basic multiplication section of [8] , since ciphertexts and the decryption algorithm in YASHE have a very similar structure to those in [8] .
First
Step. Let c 1 , c 2 ∈ R be ciphertexts that encrypt messages m 1 , m 2 ∈ R.
In the first step of the homomorphic multiplication operation, we computẽ
The following theorem shows that c mult ,
, and it provides a bound for the size ofṽ mult . Thus,c mult can be viewed as an encryption of [
Theorem 1 (Multiplication Noise). Let c 1 , c 2 ∈ R be ciphertexts encrypting m 1 , m 2 ∈ R, decryptable with the secret key f . Let v 1 , v 2 ∈ R be the inherent noise terms in c 1 , c 2 and let V > 0 such that v i ∞ ≤ V < ∆/2, i ∈ {1, 2}. Letc mult be the intermediate ciphertext in YASHE.Mult, and let
Starting with two ciphertexts at a given inherent noise level, the first step of the multiplication increases the inherent noise level by a multiplicative factor of roughly δ 2 t w,tB key w and an additive term of δ 2 2 w,tB key w(t 2 + 1 4 w,tB key w). Key Switching. The second part in the homomorphic multiplication procedure is a key switching step, which transforms the ciphertextc mult into a ciphertext c mult that is decryptable under the original secret key f . We use the evaluation key
output by YASHE.KeyGen where e, s ← χ 3 w,q err are vectors of polynomials sampled from the error distribution χ err and [·] q is applied to each coefficient of the vector. Note that this key is a vector of quasi-encryptions of f −1 P w,q (D w,q (f )⊗D w,q (f )) that depend on the secret key f , under its corresponding public key and that it is made public because it is needed for the homomorphic multiplication operation. Therefore, we need to make a circular security assumption, namely that the scheme is still secure even given that evk is publicly known (see Section 4.2). The following lemma deduces a bound on the noise caused by the key switching procedure and states an overall bound on the noise growth during a single homomorphic multiplication operation. 
Theorem 1 and Lemma 3 give an overall upper bound on the noise growth during a homomorphic multiplication. This clearly dominates the noise growth for homomorphic addition. 
Correctness
This section discusses the correctness of YASHE and shows that it is a leveled homomorphic encryption scheme. We state correctness by giving an asymptotic bound on the number of multiplicative levels in an arithmetic circuit that can be correctly evaluated. For this, we concretely focus on a parameter setting such that the assumptions of the theorem by Stehlé and Steinfeld (see Theorem 7 in Appendix A) hold. This means that the DSPR problem is hard in R q . We therefore fix the following parameters: let d be a power of 2, n = ϕ(d), ∈ (0, 1), k ∈ (1/2, 1) and let q = 2 d be a prime such that Φ d (X) = X n + 1 splits into n irreducible factors modulo q. Let χ key be a discrete Gaussian distribution on R q with deviation σ key ≥ d log(8dq) · q k , and let χ err be an asymptotically ω( d log(d))-bounded Gaussian distribution on R where d tends to infinity. Finally, we fix w = 2 and t = 2, but note that similar results hold for general w, t -this restriction is merely for the purpose of exposition.
Theorem 2 (Correctness of YASHE).
For the parameter choices above, YASHE can evaluate any circuit of depth
.
Security
To prove security of YASHE, we need to assume that IND-CPA security can be maintained even when an adversary has access to elements of the evaluation key evk. Due to the way we construct evk it is not sufficient to simply replace f by L distinct secret keys f i , as has been done in previous works -a specific assumption is still required. This is a form of key dependent message security, for the family of functions defining the evaluation key. Under this "circular security" assumption, the IND-CPA security of YASHE follows from the IND-CPA security of the scheme Basic described in Section 3 and the RLWE assumption.
Theorem 3 (Security of YASHE). The scheme YASHE is IND-CPA secure under the RLWE d,q,χerr assumption and the assumption that the scheme remains IND-CPA secure, even when an adversary has access to evk output by YASHE.KeyGen(d, q, 2, χ key , χ err , 2).
Proof. Since σ key ≥ d log(8dq) · q k for some k > 1/2 + ν with ν > 0, the conditions of Theorem 7 are satisfied. Hence the public key is indistinguishable from a uniform element of R × q . It follows from [24] that the scheme Basic is IND-CPA secure under the RLWE d,q,χerr assumption in R q . Under the circular security assumption outlined above, the IND-CPA security of YASHE follows.
For the proof of Theorem 3, we only need parameters that satisfy the assumptions in Theorem 7. For the parameters outlined at the beginning of this subsection, the RLWE assumption is believed to be hard based on standard worst-case lattice problems.
From Leveled to Fully Homomorphic Encryption
In [9] , Gentry showed how a fully homomorphic scheme can be obtained from a leveled homomorphic scheme supporting computation of circuits of sufficient depth. If a scheme can evaluate its own decryption circuit and one additional multiplication, then that scheme can be converted to a fully homomorphic scheme. The only caveat is that we have to make an additional assumption: to execute the bootstrapping procedure, it is necessary to augment the public key with encryptions YASHE.Encrypt(pk, sk[j]) of the bits of the secret key, under its corresponding public key. Similarly to the assumption on the evaluation key, we need to make an additional assumption that including encryptions of bits of the secret key does not affect security.
To achieve a fully homomorphic scheme, we simply view the decryption circuit as a circuit computed on the bits of the secret key at a ciphertext c we wish to refresh. The noise in the resulting fresh ciphertext will be of fixed size depending on the noise in the encryptions of the bits of the secret key. Lemma 6 and Theorem 8 in Appendix H show that YASHE can be bootstrapped to a fully homomorphic scheme.
A More Practical Variant of the Scheme
In this section, we propose a more practical variant YASHE of YASHE. The difference to YASHE lies in the homomorphic multiplication procedure. In YASHE , an intermediate ciphertext is simply a single polynomial while it is a vector of polynomials in YASHE. This results in an evaluation key that consists of only w,q polynomials instead of 3 w,q for YASHE and thus in a simpler key switching procedure. We now state the scheme and discuss the noise growth during the simplified homomorphic multiplication operation YASHE .Mult.
• YASHE .ParamsGen(λ): Output (d, q, t, χ key , χ err ) ← BasicParamsGen(λ).
• YASHE .KeyGen(d, q, t, χ key , χ err , w): Compute h, f ← Basic.KeyGen(d, q, t, χ key , χ err ). Sample e, s ← χ w,q err , compute γ = [P w,q (f ) + e + h · s] q ∈ R w,q . and output (pk, sk, evk) = (h, f, γ).
• YASHE .Encrypt(pk, m): Encrypt m ∈ R as c ← Basic.Encrypt(pk, m) ∈ R.
• YASHE .Decrypt(sk, c): Output the message m ← Basic.Decrypt(sk, c) ∈ R.
•
Theorem 4 (Multiplication Noise
Key Switching. The key switching algorithm now transforms such an intermediate encryption into a ciphertext that can be decrypted with f itself. The evaluation key is evk = [P w,q (f ) + e + h · s] q , where e, s ← χ w,q err are vectors of polynomials sampled from the error distribution χ err . Again, this key is a vector of quasi-encryptions of the secret key f under its corresponding public key. It is required for the homomorphic multiplication operation and is therefore made public. This means, we need to make a circular security assumption as for YASHE, namely that the scheme is still secure even given that evk is publicly known. The following lemma gives a bound on the key switching noise. 
2 t w,q wB err B key .
Correctness & Security of YASHE
In the following theorem, we give an explicit bound for correctness of a homomorphic evaluation of an arithmetic circuit in R/tR of multiplicative depth L that is organized in a leveled tree structure of multiplications without any additions. At each level all ciphertexts are assumed to have inherent noise terms of roughly the same size. The bounds that we obtain might be too large and could be significantly reduced for computations that involve more additions and less multiplications as well as multiplications of ciphertexts with imbalanced inherent noise terms. In favor of simplicity, we restrict to the above setting.
Theorem 5 (Correctness of YASHE ). Let 1 = 4(δtB key ) −1 . The scheme YASHE can correctly evaluate an arithmetic circuit consisting of L-levels of multiplications in R/tR on ciphertexts with inherent noise of size at most V that are arranged in a binary tree of L levels of multiplications if
Appendix K gives detailed bounds on the increase of the inherent noise terms in ciphertexts during homomorphic addition and multiplication. One can take these bounds to deduce overall bounds for the exact computation that is supposed to be carried out on encrypted data. The obtained bounds can then be used to deduce tailored parameters for the scheme to ensure correctness and security for that particular setting, possibly resulting in more efficient parameters for the specific computation.
The security of YASHE is based on the RLWE assumption and a circular security assumption similar to the one for YASHE. The price we pay for a simpler homomorphic multiplication operation lies in an additional security assumption. Since YASHE only works for a much narrower key distribution that does not satisfy the requirements for applying the Stehlé and Steinfeld result ([24, Thm. 4.1], see also Theorem 7 in Appendix A), security also relies on the Decisional Small Polynomial Ratio (DSPR) assumption, as stated in Section 2. In YASHE, this assumption could be avoided by making the scheme work with a key distribution as demanded by [24] . Following the same hybrid argument as in [15] , one can prove that the scheme described in this section is secure under the DSPR assumption and the RLWE assumption (see [15, Section 3.3] ). If a, b are two elements sampled from a Gaussian with very small standard deviation or from a different distribution that yields polynomials with very small coefficients only, the ratio h = a/b can clearly not be uniform because the number of elements for a and b is too small and produces only a small number of values for h when compared to all elements in R q . Still, a computationally bounded adversary might not be able to distinguish such a case from uniform randomly chosen h.
Theorem 6 (Security of YASHE ). Let d be a positive integer, q and t < q be two moduli, w be a fixed positive integer, and let χ key and χ err be distributions on R. The scheme YASHE is IND-CPA secure under the RLWE d,q,χerr assumption, the DSPR d,q,χ key assumption, and the assumption that the scheme remains IND-CPA secure even when the evaluation key evk which is output by YASHE .KeyGen(d, q, t, χ key , χ err ) is known to the adversary. Remark 1. The DSPR d,q,χ key assumption can be replaced by a weaker assumption DSPR d,q,χ f ,χg , where the elements f and g that are used for the public key h = [tgf −1 ] q are sampled from distributions of different width with bounds B f and B g , respectively. This new assumption can be made weaker than the original assumption since the element g can be sampled from a much wider distribution than f . Introducing these two distributions means that the noise bound for the inherent noise in a fresh ciphertext is changed to δt(B err (B f + B g ) + r t (q)B f /2). The proofs of the noise bounds for YASHE .Mult show that the bound B g only influences the constant C 2 in Lemma 9. The contributions of B g in the noise bounds for L levels of multiplications are merely a constant factor independent of L. Therefore, the scheme is still leveled homomorphic with the weaker assumption.
Remark 2. For YASHE , since private keys are sampled with very small norm, the circular security assumption can be avoided in the usual way by providing a different public/private key pair (h i , f i ) for each level i of multiplications for 0 ≤ i ≤ L. The evaluation key has to be extended to L vectors 
Parameters
In this section, we give suggestions for choosing concrete parameters which can be used as a guideline to instantiate practical schemes with varying complexity. There are multiple parameters one can adjust, so we restrict ourselves to a subset of choices which we think are most relevant. We consider two settings. In the first, we fix a specific size for the modulus q. This is interesting for instance when a fast modular multiplication implementation (in either hard-or software) is already available, and one prefers to use this to boost the scheme's performance. We fix different sizes for the modulus q starting from 64 bits up to 1024 bits. The other setting focuses on special-purpose polynomial arithmetic. Here, we fix the degree n = ϕ(d) to be a power of 2 between 2 11 and 2 16 . The parameters presented in Table 1 are obtained by following the security analysis of Lindner and Peikert [14] under the assumption that the results from [14] in the LWE setting carry over to the RLWE setting, and assuming that the assumptions in Section 5.1 hold. This analysis is similar to the ones from [11, 8, 13] and we refer to [11] for a more complete discussion of assumptions made in deriving parameters. Note that recent results by Chen and Nguyen [6] are considered to be more accurate for estimating the security of specific parameters using the simulation of the BKZ 2.0 algorithm for assessing the runtime of lattice basis reduction. Selecting parameters for YASHE with this method is ongoing work at the time of writing this paper. However, it is expected that the parameters presented in this paper which are obtained by using the LindnerPeikert method are more conservative than those obtained with the BKZ 2.0 simulation. Table 1 . Parameters that guarantee security of λ = 80 bits against the distinguishing attack with advantage = 2 −80 . We fix w = 2 32 , the key distribution is assumed to be bounded by B key = 1, and we use σerr = 8 and Berr = 6σerr. Either for fixed sizes of q, we give the minimal degree nmin (left part), or for fixed dimension n, we give the maximal size log(qmax) (right part). For each pair (q, n) according to the given sizes, and different values of t, correctness is guaranteed for at most Lmax multiplicative levels. Next, we discuss in more detail the parameter selection recommendations made in Table 1 . We use B key = 1, in other words we are assuming that even when the polynomials f , g have coefficients in {−1, 0, 1}, the public key h = [tgf −1 ] q is indistinguishable from uniform. The standard deviation of the error distribution is fixed at σ err = 8; this is consistent with [18] . The high probability bound on the size of the coefficients of errors drawn from Gaussian distributions is chosen as 6σ err .
To distinguish with an advantage of in the RLWE problem, an adversary is required to find vectors of length at most α · (q/σ) where α = ln(1/ )/π. In our specific parameter examples, we use = 2 −80 , which results in α ≈ 4.201. We refer to [14] for a more complete description of a distinguishing attack and the precise lattices we are required to find short vectors in. Running SchnorrEuchner's BKZ [21] , the best known lattice reduction algorithm in practice, and its successor BKZ 2.0 [6] for security parameter λ (following [11] we use λ = 80) one expects to find vectors of length 2 2 √ n log 2 (q) log 2 (δRHF) in time T BKZ = 2 λ where δ RHF is the so-called root Hermite factor. This latter quantity is the overwhelming factor determining the quality of the basis which can be achieved in a given time and is computed as in [14] from log 2 (T BKZ ) = 1.8/ log 2 (δ RHF ) − 110.
It is currently infeasible to achieve a target root Hermite factor δ RHF < 1.005 [6] . To guarantee security, we require that the shortest vector obtained through lattice reduction is longer than a vector which could give an adversary a nonnegligible advantage in the Ring-LWE distinguishing problem. This means that for security we thus require
For fixed parameters α and δ RHF , this inequality provides bounds on the remaining parameters q, σ err and n. Fixing σ err too (σ err = 8 here), we get a dependency between q and n that is expressed in the two settings discussed above as follows.
When we fix q, we obtain a lower bound n min for the dimension n to guarantee security against the distinguishing attack. For the example values for the sizes of q given in the first column of the left part of Table 1 , we list this minimal degree in the second column. We used the worst case bound for a modulus q of that size. Vice versa, first fixing the degree n means that we get an upper bound q max for q. We display the relation between n and the size log(q max ) in the first two columns of the right part of Table 1 .
For guaranteeing correctness, we use the noise bounds derived in the previous section. As mentioned in Section 2, when d is a power of 2 and thus Φ d (X) = X n + 1, the expansion factor is δ = n. Then, by Lemma 1 and Lemma 9 we know that our scheme can correctly evaluate a depth L circuit as long as
is less than (∆ − r t (q))/2, where 1 = 4(ntB key ) −1 and V = ntB key (2B err + r t (q)/2) is the inherent noise of fresh ciphertexts by Lemma 2. For each row in either the left or the right part of Table 1 , we take the given values for q and n together with different values for t and check what is the maximum number of levels L max for which the correctness bound still holds. Note that in the left part, we take the minimal degree n min . This means that when choosing a power of 2 for the degree, the values for L max might change. In the right part, we take the largest possible value for q with the given maximal bit size.
It is important to ensure that the security bounds as well as the correctness bounds are both satisfied. Note that the authors of [8] failed to check their parameters presumably obtained from the correctness bound in the security bound, too, resulting in insecure parameters of q = 2 1358 and n = 2 10 .
Implementation
Currently there are not many known implementation results for FHE schemes. Some of those which have been published demonstrate that the current stateof-the-art's performance is still rather unsatisfactory, see for example the implementations which are capable of computing AES homomorphically [11, 7] . Other people have focused on implementing relatively simple schemes that require only a few levels of multiplications [13] . When using the ring R = Z[X]/(X 4096 + 1), t = 2 10 and a 130-bit prime q, the authors of [13] present implementation results on an Intel Core 2 Duo running at 2.1 GHz. Encryption takes 756 ms, addition of ciphertexts 4 ms, multiplication of ciphertexts 1590 ms (this includes the degree reduction) and decryption 57 ms.
We have implemented the YASHE variant proposed in Section 5 in a Clibrary. All the arithmetic has been built from scratch and we do not depend on any external number theory library. Using almost the same parameters (we use a 127-bit prime q) with w = 2 32 we obtained the following results on an Intel Core i7-3520M at 2893.484 MHz with hyperthreading turned off and overclocking ("turbo boost") disabled. Encryption runs in 79.2 million cycles (27 ms), addition of ciphertexts in 70 thousand cycles (0.024 ms), multiplication of ciphertexts (including the key-switching) in 90.7 million cycles (31 ms) and decryption in 14.1 million cycles (5 ms).
This performance increase by at least one order of magnitude (for the decryption) to two orders of magnitude (for the addition of ciphertexts) can be partially explained by the fact that we are running on a more recent processor and that we implemented the scheme directly in C (avoiding the overhead incurred by using a computer algebra system as in [13] ). The remainder of the speed-up is due to our newly proposed scheme, in particular due to a simpler multiplication operation on ciphertexts that uses a more compact evaluation key consisting of only 4 elements. These performance numbers highlight the fact that HE is much more practical for schemes which do not require very deep circuits (like AES) but instead only need a few (around 2 2 to 2 5 ) multiplications.
Truncating Ciphertext Words
Brakerski [2, Section 4.2] first suggested for his scale-invariant LWE scheme to discard some least significant bits of the ciphertext. Based on this idea, we describe an optimization to our scheme which significantly reduces both the ciphertext length and the number of elements in the evaluation key. By aligning the number of bits we discard with a multiple of w used in YASHE.KeySwitch, the number of elements required to switch keys is reduced per multiplication. Define YASHE.Discard w (c, i) as the function which takes as input a ciphertext and the number 0 ≤ i < w,q of w-words to be truncated and outputs c = YASHE.Discard w (c, i) = w −i c . Then, w i c is equal to c with the i least significant w-words of c being set to 0.
For a constant B > 0 such that 2B > δ f ∞ /2, if we discard log w (2B) − log w (δ f ∞ ) words, we incur an additional noise term of size B, but the ciphertext can now be represented by log w (q/B) + log w (δ f ∞ /2) words. This means that, with discarding, the length of ciphertexts does not depend on the absolute value of q but only on the ratio of q to the noise in the ciphertext. Perhaps more importantly, this means that when we consider D w,q (c) for a ciphertext c with coefficients represented by roughly log w (q/B) words, all the lowest log w (B) words are now zero. If c is a ciphertext decryptable under f 2 , in the key switching step, we only need the top log w (q/B) elements from the evaluation key to carry out the switch.
Encoding input data via the CRT
For our leveled homomorphic encryption scheme, we have given bounds on parameters and input data to ensure correctness and security. For applications such as outsourcing of storage and computation on private data to the cloud, it could be the case that the user requires a flexible system which allows for additional computation, more computation than was planned for when setting system parameters. We propose a way to extend the system to allow additional computation without resetting the parameters. For computations on integer values, the encoding of larger integers using the Chinese Remainder theorem allows for either greater precision of computation or larger integer inputs, using the same underlying field size and lattice dimension but at the cost of increasing the number of ciphertexts to be operated on.
Integer computations with results up to a bound B are done by encoding each input as a collection of integers modulo coprime t i via the CRT. Computations are then carried out on the collection and correctly reflect the integer operations not involving any modular reductions, as long as the product of the t i is greater than B. Each integer in the collection is encrypted as a separate ciphertext with respect to its corresponding plain text modulus t i and those ciphertexts can be processed in parallel to return encrypted collections. After they are decrypted, the CRT is used to recover the output as an actual integer.
This approach is different than the ones introduced in [22] and [7] , since in contrast to these schemes, we do not use the CRT to pack information into different plain text slots of a single ciphertext. Instead, we simply encrypt each part of the CRT encoding in a separate ciphertext with respect to its plain text modulus t i . This introduces a different way of flexibility. Ciphertexts now consist of several ring elements, but can be processed in parallel. For example, this allows to work on integers of double bit length by keeping the same parameters, only extending to two ciphertexts with different values for t 0 and t 1 .
Conclusions
We have proposed a new fully homomorphic encryption scheme based on the scheme by Stehlé and Steinfeld which removes the non-standard decisional small polynomial ratio assumption needed in the homomorphic encryption scheme by López-Alt, Tromer and Vaikuntanathan. Hence, the security is solely based on standard lattice assumptions and a circular security assumption. Our new scheme avoids modulus switching and keeps the size of ciphertexts to a single ring element. Furthermore, we have presented a more practical variant of our scheme which does need the decisional small polynomial ratio assumption. For this latter scheme we presented parameters and implementation results. be the spherical discrete Gaussian distribution on R q , restricted to R × q , and for z ∈ R q , let χ z = χ + z be the Gaussian shifted by z.
A The Stehlé-Steinfeld theorem
Theorem 7 (Stehlé and Steinfeld [25] ). Let 0 < < 1/3 , t ∈ R × q , χ and σ as above, y i ∈ R q and z i = −y i t −1 (mod q) for i ∈ {1, 2}. Then the statistical distance D between distributions
and q ≥ d kq 1−2kq .
B Proof of Lemma 1
Since
Using q = ∆t + r t (q) and setting = r t (q)/t, this yields 
C Proof of Lemma 2
We have c = ∆[m] t + e + hs for e, s ← χ err . Using ∆t = −r t (q) (mod q), it follows that
Define v = f e + tgs − r t (q)f [m] t . Since f , g ← χ key and s, e ← χ err , we obtain f e ∞ , tgs ∞ < δtB key B err and f [m] t ∞ < δB key t/2. Altogether, v ∞ < 2δtB key B err + r t (q)δtB key /2.
where s ∈ R and r r =
Note that all terms on the right hand side of the equation are elements of R, except possibly r r , which is bounded by r r ∞ < 1 2 + r t (q)δt.
Proof. The bounds on r m and r v can be derived as follows. First, we have
Since r v ∈ R, we get 2 r v ∞ ≤ δ min i v i ∞ . Multiplying out and making use of the equality q − r t (q) = ∆t, we obtain 
where we have used the bound on r v ∞ and the fact that v i ∞ < ∆/2.
E Proof of Theorem 1
To analyse how largeṽ mult is, let v 1 , v 2 ∈ R be the inherent noise terms in
for i ∈ {1, 2}, this means we can write
for polynomials r i ∈ R. We assume that the assumptions in Lemma 1 are satisfied and that the v i are chosen such that v i ∞ < (∆ − r t (q))/2. In particular, c 1 , c 2 are decryptable. Since the coefficients of P w,q (c i ) are bounded by q/2 in absolute value, those of D w,q (f ) by w/2, and D w,q (f ) has at most w,tB key = log w (tB key ) + 2 non-zero entries, the polynomials r i can be bounded by
Note that we have used ∆ ≤ q/t, v i ∞ < ∆/2 and the definition of δ. Multiplying the scalar products P w,q (c 1 ), D w,q (f ) and P w,q (c 2 ), D w,q (f ) , using
and substituting Equation (2) yields
Next, we incorporate [m 1 m 2 ] t into the above expression and scale by t/q. As observed in [8] , simply scaling by ∆ would give an additional error term caused by rounding of q 2 r 1 r 2 . To make things more clear we expand the exposition of [8] for our scheme in Lemma 5, which is stated and proved in Appendix D. We obtain
where r m , r v , and r r are as in Lemma 5 and we have r m ∞ < 
The coefficients of all polynomials in the vector in the left argument of the scalar product are bounded in absolute value by 1/2, while those in the vector in the right argument are products of polynomials with coefficients bounded by w/2. We are now in a position to bound the inherent noise term in the intermediate ciphertextc mult after the first part of the homomorphic multiplication procedure. Again, this is very similar to [8] .
From Equations (4) and (5) we have c mult , We simplify the expression by replacing the v i ∞ by a common upper bound V , e.g. V = max{ v 1 ∞ , v 2 ∞ }. This makes sense if the inherent noise terms are known to be of roughly the same size. If they are of different magnitudes, one gets more precise bounds by using the more complicated formulas that keep these sizes as separate inputs. Using r t (q) < t, we obtain the claimed bound.
F Proof of Lemma 3
It is f c mult = c mult , D w,q (f ) ⊗ D w,q (f ) + f D w,q (c mult ), e + gt D w,q (c mult ), s (mod q). We substitute c mult , D w,q (f ) ⊗ D w,q (f ) from Theorem 1 and obtain f c = ∆[m 1 m 2 ] t + v mult (mod q) with v mult =ṽ mult + f D w,q (c mult ), e + tg D w,q (c mult ), s (mod q).
We bound D w,q (c mult ), e ∞ ≤ δ 3 w,q w 2 B err . We get the same bound when e is replaced by s. With f ∞ , tg ∞ < tB key we deduce v mult ∞ < ṽ mult ∞ + 2δ · tB key · δ Next, we introduce a common bound V > 0 for the size of the inherent noise in fresh ciphertexts, and assume that the noise growth for homomorphic additions can be neglected when compared to that for multiplications. By Lemma 2, we know that we can take V < δtB key (2B err + 1 2 r t (q)) ≤ 2δt 2 B key B err . By iterating the previous bound for L levels of multiplications, we deduce that for a depth L circuit consisting of additions and multiplications the noise in the ciphertext is bounded by C The above can be satisfied if L = O (1 − k) log(q) log(log(q)) + log(d) .
H Fully homomorphic encryption
The following lemma estimates the depth of the decryption circuit for YASHE.
Lemma 6. The decryption circuit for YASHE can be implemented as a polynomial size circuit of depth O(log(log(q)) + log(d)) over F 2 .
L Proof of Theorem 5
The proof is subdivided into the following corollary and lemma. The corollary simply combines the noise growth bounds from the first step of the multiplication and from the key switching part based on a common upper bound V for the inherent noise of the original ciphertexts.
Corollary 1. In addition to the assumptions made in Lemma 8, let V > 0 be such that v i ∞ ≤ V < ∆/2 for i ∈ {1, 2}. Let 1 = 4(δtB key ) −1 . Then the norms of the inherent noise terms v add and v mult satisfy v add ∞ ≤ 2V +r t (q) < 2V + t and v mult ∞ < C 1 V + C 2 , for C 1 = (1 + 1 )δ 2 t 2 B key , C 2 = δ 2 tB key (t(B key + t) + w,q wB err ) .
Proof. Theorem 4 shows that we can take C 1 = δt(4 + δtB key ), which is equal to the above expression. We get the constant C 2 from Theorem 4 and Lemma 4.
The following lemma iterates L levels of multiplications and deduces an overall noise bound for this operation.
Lemma 9. Let c ∈ R be a ciphertext that is the homomorphic product of ciphertexts of inherent noise size at most V arranged in a tree of L levels of multiplications. Let v ∈ R be the inherent noise term in c. Then the norm of v can be bounded by
Using the bounds in Corollary 1, we obtain
L key (t(B key + t) + w,q wB err ) = (1 + 1 ) L−1 δ 2L t 2L−1 B L key ((1 + 1 )tV + L (t(B key + t) + w,q wB err )) .
Proof. This follows by induction on L by repeatedly applying the bound in Corollary 1.
Theorem 5 follows from Lemma 9 and Lemma 1.
